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D.C. DUI DISTURBIA:
THE INTENDED POLICY AND ITS EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS
by Monika Mastellone
1M1 y r\licles wr itten on the topic of
1 In\k dtriing o>eii focls on the negative im-
p1et :Md cmnsiequu (& drunk driving, and
emphasize the need to crackdown on intoxicat-
ed drivers by implementing harsher laws and
more severe punishments. In response to the
public outcry over drunk driving, state law en-
forcements have been pushing forward efforts
to enforce stricter laws that conform to the
public's desire to catch intoxicated drivers and
punish them for breaking the law.' In 2012, the
District of Columbia amended its DUI Statute
to include harsher penalties and stricter stan-
dards as a means to deter drinking and driving,
while simultaneously broadening its defini-
tions of impairment.2 In effect, D.C. law en-
forcement is granted the authority to arrest and
1 See, e.g., Journal Editorial Board, Editorial:
Habitual Drunk Drivers: State Senate Must Follow House in
Crackdown, WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL (Oct. 20, 2013), http://
wwwjournalnow.com/opinion/editorials/article 23147d6e-
3824-1 1e3 -bfl 1-00 1a4bcf6878.html (summarizing DUI
crackdown efforts in North Carolina); T&D Staff Report,
State, Local Officials Plan DUI Crackdown, THE TINms AND
DEMOCRAT (Aug. 17, 2013), http://thetandd.com/state-local-
officials-plan-dui-crackdown/article_23 3c4a82-07ab- 11e3 -
a719-00 la4bcf887a.html (discussing DUI crack down efforts
in South Carolina); Staff Report, NJ Police Begin Drunk
Driving Crackdown Effort, NJ TODAY (Aug. 16, 2013), http://
njtoday.net/2013/08/16/nj -police-begin-drunk-driving-
crackdown-effort/ (explaining the DUI crackdown initiative in
New Jersey).
2 See generally, Comprehensive Impaired Driving
and Alcohol Testing Program Emergency Amendment
Act of 2012, available at http://dcclimsl.dccouncil.us/
images/0000 1/20120712151430.pdf (describing the changes
in the new DUI law including an increase in mandatory-
minimum sentences for certain DUI offenses).
prosecute persons for driving under the influ-
ence who have blood-alcohol content (BAC) lev-
els well below the "legal limit" of 0.08 percent.3
As a result of this new policy, not only
has law enforcement successfully broadened
its ability to catch intoxicated drivers, but the
D.C. criminal justice system has allowed for ar-
rests, charges, and even convictions of drivers
who were either driving within the legal limit,
or who were not under any influence of alcohol
(or drugs) at all.' While no one contests the vi-
tal importance of thwarting the serious, harm-
ful effects caused by drunk driving, a new issue
has evolved that deserves some focus: the nega-
tive repercussions that result from over-zealous
attempts to catch intoxicated drivers.
When these statutory changes were
passed and enacted, the President of the Wash-
ington Regional Alcohol Program, Kurt Erik-
son, stated "w]ith more than a quarter of the
District's traffic deaths being caused by drunk
drivers, these are necessary if not lifesaving
new laws."' The fact is, however, that the imple-
3 See id.
4 Although convictions have been upheld where the
defendant produced a breath score of 0.00 percent because
evidence indicated that the defendant was under the influence
of drugs rather than alcohol, see, e.g., Derrick Carrington v.
District of Columbia, No. 11-CT-698 (D.C. Oct. 17, 2013),
this article focuses solely on instances where the defendant
contained a BAC level of 0.00 percent and where the police
failed to indicate any suspicion of drugs.
5 Robert Thomson, D.C. Toughens Drunk Driving
Law, Restores Breath Test, WASH. POST (July 31, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/post/dc-
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mentation of these changes does not just save
lives, but can ruin them as well. When a person
is charged with and subsequently convicted
of driving under the influence, certain conse-
quences result: court dates; large fines; lawyers'
fees as well as other costly fees; loss of license;
probation requirements; potential jail time;
and perhaps the most difficult hardship the
loss of one's job or the inability to pursue cer-
tain career endeavors due to a potentially erro-
neous DUI conviction. Particularly, D.C. police
authorities' have arbitrarily failed people dur-
ing field sobriety tests,' prosecutors are charg-
ing people under the DUI statute who have
produced breath test scores of well below 0.08
percent (the 'alleged' legal limit)' and worst
of all, judges are convicting these individuals.9
Indeed, it appears that the District of Columbia
has reached the point where completely sober
people should fear driving in the District.
toughens-drunk-driving-law-restores-breath-test/2012/07/31/
gJQADOr7MNX blog.html (referring to the stricter standards
and harsher penalties implemented through the 2012
amendments to the D.C. DUI Statute as the "new laws").
6 D.C. Police authorities include the Metropolitan
Police Department (MPD), the United States Park Police
(USPP), the United States Capitol Police (USCP), the Metro
Transit Police, and the Secret Service-all vested with the
authority to perform DUI stops and arrests. WASHINGTON PEACE
CENTER, http://www.washingtonpeacecenter.org/dccops (last
visited Dec. 18, 2013) (listing the numerous law enforcement
agencies that have jurisdiction in Washington, D.C.).
7 D.C. DUI Attorney Bryan Brown, for example,
tried a case in D.C. Superior Court a few years ago in which
a police officer testified that the defendant had failed the
Horizontal and Vertical Nystagmus tests in both eyes. This
testimony proved to be fabricated during cross-examination
when the defendant then popped out his glass eye in open
court. Telephone Interview with Bryan Brown, Esquire, Law
Office of Bryan Brown (Oct. 24, 2013) (notes on file with
author).
8 See David J. Hanson, DWIArrests at Zero BAC in
DC, ALCOHOL PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, available at http://
www2.potsdam.edu/hansondj/Drivingissues/1 133276608.
html#.UrOA1PRDt8E (discussing officers' habit of arresting
persons for DUI who have produced breath scores well below
0.08 percent, and focusing on one particular instance in
which a woman was arrested for DUI after having one glass
of chardonnay and producing a breath score of only 0.03
percent).
9 Telephone interview with Bryan Brown, supra
note 7 (noting that in the summer of 2013, for instance, a
D.C. Superior Court judge convicted a man of DUI who had
produced a breath score of 0.02 percent).
Accordingly, this article sheds light on
the issue of overreaching DUI laws that often
result in unjust DUI prosecutions. This ar-
ticle also discusses the policy implications of
the specific D.C. DUI Statute, issues with law
enforcement training, problems that these ef-
forts have caused, and suggestions for possible
future resolution. While a complete fix of the
problem may not be immediately foreseeable,
the more awareness and knowledge that D.C.
DUI attorneys possess on the issue, the great-
er chance that progress will be made toward
achieving a solution.
I. D.C.'s DUI Dilemma
In 2010, there were seven deaths in the
District of Columbia caused by drunk driving.10
In 2011, this number increased by one, result-
ing in a total of eight deaths caused by drunk
driving throughout the District of Columbia."
The next year, in 2012, the D.C. legislature re-
sponded by introducing new legislation that
included stricter standards and harsher pen-
alties. Specifically, in July 2012, the D.C. City
Council passed the Comprehensive Impaired
Driving Act of 2012 ("Act"), signed into law by
Mayor Vincent Gray.1 2
The Act cracks down on drunk driving
by implementing greater maximum penalties
for first-time offenders, while increasing the
mandatory minimum sentences for repeat of-
fenders. The maximum jail times for first-time
offenders increased from 90 days to 180 days,
and the maximum fine for first-time offend-
ers increased from S300 to S1,000.1 Repeat
offenders now face a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten days in jail if their BAC is 0.20
percent or higher, and twenty days in jail if
their BAC level reaches 0.30 percent.1 4 More-
over, should these mandatory minimum terms
of incarceration apply in a particular case, the
10 MADD, 2011 Drunk Driving Fatalities by State,
http://www.madd.org/blog/2012/december/2011-State-data.
html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
11 Id.
12 See Thomson, supra note 5.
13 D.C. CODE § 50-2206.13 (2013).
14 Id.
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Act now precludes the possibility of serving in-
carceration terms on weekends or in a halfway
house setting."' Thus, all incarceration terms
must be served consecutively and no part of
the mandatory minimum sentence may be sus-
pended."
In addition, the Act "establishe[d] new
oversight for the D.C. police department's
breath-testing programs and a certification
program for officers using the equipment.""
The purpose behind this provision was to allow
officers to resume breath testing, so that con-
victions were no longer based merely on uri-
nalysis" and standardized field sobriety test 9
(SFST) results. 20
15 See D.C. CODE§ 50-2206.01(11) (2013) (defining
"Mandatory minimum term of incarceration"); D.C. CODE §50-
2206.57 (2013) (expanding on the meaning of "Mandatory
minimum periods"); see also Michael Bruckheim, District
of Columbia 's New D UI Law Part 3: No More Weekends,
BRUCKLAW.COM (May 7, 2013), http://www.brucklaw.com/
part-3-no-more-weekends (describing the "severe financial or
occupational consequences" that individuals may face due to
the fact that the weekend program is no longer available).
16 See § 50-2206.57(b).
17 See Thomson, supra note 5.
18 There is a current debate over the accuracy of
urinalysis. Dr. Lucas Zarwell, the Chief Toxicologist for the
District of Columbia, has testified to the D.C. Council that
urine does not provide an accurate means for measuring a
person's level of intoxication because there is no scientific
correlation between the concentration of alcohol in the urine
sample and the person's actual blood alcohol concentration.
See Zarwell Testimony on Urine, YouTUBE (Sept. 26, 2013,
00:44), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FUmhJjPF1E ("If
you're going to look at urine concentrations of alcohol and
science, there is a very loose correlation.").
19 SFSTs commonly include the Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus Test, the Walk and Turn test, and the One Leg
Stand test, having accuracy rates of 77%, 68%, and 65%,
respectively. See 2006 NHTSA SFST Manual (2006),
available at http://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oag/
publication/attachments/2006 % 20NHTSA%20SFST%/o20
Manual.pdf.
20 The Metropolitan Police Department had suspended
breath testing the previous year after a consultant found that
faulty testing equipment had inflated test results, resulting
in nearly 400 convictions based on inaccurate results. See
Mary Pat Flaherty, 400 DWIs in D.C. based on faulty data,
WASH. POST, June 10, 2010, at Al, A7, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/
AR2010060906257.html ("Nearly 400 people were convicted
of driving while intoxicated in the District since fall 2008
based on inaccurate results from breath test machines, and
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While the noble intentions of the D.C.
legislature are recognized, the actual implica-
tions of this new legislation are unsettlingly
astounding. Particularly, D.C. Police authori-
ties are continuously pulling over motorists,
concluding that these motorists have failed the
SFSTs, and then once the motorist is arrested
and taken to the police station for a breathalyz-
er test, these officers will cite the motorist for
DUI even when the motorist produced a breath
score below 0.08 percent.2 1 In effect, prosecu-
tors charge these individuals with DUI, despite
their low breath scores, resulting in many indi-
viduals receiving their first criminal conviction.
In one particularly noteworthy case, a
D.C. Superior Court judge convicted a man
of DUI who had produced a breath score of a
mere 0.02 percent. 22 Additionally, D.C. law en-
forcement has the ability to charge individuals
with DUI who have produced a breath score of
0.00 even when there is neither any chemical
evidence of alcohol nor any general suspicion
of drugs being present in the motorist's sys-
tem.2' Accordingly, the statute's intended goal
of catching intoxicated drivers is instead being
perverted; the law is allowing innocent persons
to be arrested, charged, and convicted of DUI.
The root of this problem stems from
multiple factors. First, despite the fact that the
statute prescribes new breath testing regula-
tions, officers do not breath test on the scene.
half of them went to jail[.]"); Thomson, supra note 5. This
sparked civil suits that resulted in the city paying out $368,000
to select convicted DUI drivers who chose to pursue the
civil suit; however, very few drivers were able to get rid of
their criminal convictions. See Mike Debonis, Three Years
After Breathalyzer Scandal, D.C. Police RestartAlcohol
Breath Testing, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/mike-debonis/wp/2013/01/09/
three-years-after-breathalyzer-scandal-d-c-police-restart-
alcohol-breath-testing/ (stating that of the 50 drivers who
challenged their DUI convictions, only two ultimately
prevailed in getting their charges tossed).
21 See Hanson, supra note 8.
22 Telephone interview with David Akulian, Criminal
Defense Attorney, Law Offices of David Akulian (Oct. 24,
2013) (noting that this case is presently pending appeal in
front of D.C. Superior Court Judge Marisa DeMeo).
23 See Hanson, supra note 8.
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Rather, they require motorists to perform a se-
ries of SFSTs and then proceed to arrest them
based on the results of these field sobriety tests.
After the arrest, the motorist is taken to the po-
lice station and given a breath test. Notably,
many times this breath score is not admitted at
trial because of either defective equipment or
faulty procedure.
A reading of the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration manual, used for all
D.C. police authorities' DUI detection and
SFST training, uncovers where the problem
begins to unfold.24 In the course of their train-
ing, officers are first and foremost taught that
a primary way to prevent people from driving
under the influence is to instill the "fear" of be-
ing arrested into the public. 25 The manual ex-
plains that "unless there is a real risk of arrest,
there will not be much fear of arrest."26 This
policy, alone, appears to encourage officers to
arrest as many motorists as they can; the ques-
tion that arises then is how far will officers go
in meeting this goal?
As with any traffic-stop based arrest, to
conduct a DUI arrest based on probable cause,
officers first must pull over the vehicle. Ac-
cording to their manual, an officer's suspicion
may be initially raised by witnessing either a
traffic violation, or "behavior that is unusual,
but not necessarily illegal." 27 This is referred
to as "phase one."28 Thus, according to the offi-
cers' training, unusual behavior in and of itself
can raise suspicion that someone is intoxicated.
Once an officer comes into initial contact with
the motorist, "phase two" begins. In phase two,
the officer can observe the driver by interacting
with him face-to-face. During this phase, the
officer will often ask interrupting or "unusual"
questions in order to observe the driver's abil-
ity to react to such questioning.29 Unlike with
24 2006 NHTSA SFST Manual, supra note 19.
25 See id. § 11-3 (describing the technique of "general
deterrence" as instilling in the public a "fear of being
arrested").
26 Id.
27 Id. § IV-1.
28 Id. §§ IV-2, IV-4.
29 Id. §§ IV-2, IV-4.
SFSTs, the results of these tests merely pro-
vide the officer with clues as to the person's po-
tential intoxication, but usually cannot them-
selves establish probable cause. Thus, officers
facilitate phase two in order to collect enough
reasonable suspicion to conduct the SFSTs.
In "phase three," officers will conduct
the SFSTs.30 Unlike in other jurisdictions,
D.C. police authorities do not typically perform
breath tests on the scene. In effect, if a com-
pletely sober person requests to be breathali-
zed on the spot to show the officer his or her
sobriety, he or she will likely be denied this re-
quest." Instead, he or she will be required to
perform SFSTs, a series of tests that officers
use to determine if a motorist is intoxicated,
which is often required to obtain the probable
cause necessary for the arrest.
The problem with SFSTs is that the re-
sults are unreliable. 32 It is conceivably the case
30 See id. §§ VII-1 - VII-7 (SFSTs include the
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, the Vertical Gaze Nystagmus
test, and Divided Attention tests such as the Walk and Turn
test and the One Leg Stand test).
31 Telephone Interview with Bryan Brown, supra note
7 (explaining that officers likely prefer not to perform breath
tests on the scene since they are not admissible in court as well
as an added expense and inconvenient for the officers' zero-
tolerance arrest prerogative).
32 See, e.g., Steven J. Rubenzer, The Standardized
Field Sobriety Tests: A review ofScientific and Legal
Issues, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 293 (2008), available
at http://www.thecrimestoppers.com/mse2012/SFST%/ 20
additional/o20materials/2008%/o20Rubenzer/o2OSFSTs%20
-%20Scientific/o20&%/ 2OLegal%/ 20lssues.pdf (concluding
that "the research that supports their use is limited, important
confounding variables have not been thoroughly studied,
reliability is mediocre, and that their developers and
prosecution-oriented publications have oversold the tests");
Patrick T. Barone & Jeffery S. Crampton, Do "Standardized"
Field Sobriety Tests Reliably Predict Intoxication?, 84 MICH.
BAR J., 23-26 (2005), available at http://www.michbar.org/
journal/pdf/pdf4article882.pdf (describing the problems
with SFST studies and emphasizing that the original SFST
study conducted in 1977 produced an error rate of 47%, and
another study later indicated that the HGN test is incorrectly
performed by officers 95% of the time); The Accuracy of the
Standardized Field Sobriety Test, STSFUS, http://sfst.us/
raw.html#top (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (providing raw data
from an earlier study, indicating that SFSTs are extremely
inaccurate predictors of BAC because almost everyone fails
the SFSTs); Chad Maddox, Standardized DUI Tests Are
74 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
4
Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 1 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/6
Criminal Law Practitioner
that any sober, medicated, or injured person
could easily fail them. Moreover, these tests
have error rates ranging from twenty-three to
thirty-five percent." Studies have shown that
false positives are extremely common, which
create an abundance of problems when D.C.
police authorities are using this standard to ar-
rest individuals.3 4  Specifically, SFSTs are de-
signed to provide an indication to officers that
a person is intoxicated; for example, if a person
hits four of the six clues on the horizontal gaze
nystagmus (HGN) test, this is supposed to indi-
cate to the officers that the person likely has a
blood-alcohol concentrate of at least 0.10 per-
cent.35 In 2007, however, a study assessing the
reliability of the HGN test found that persons
with blood-alcohol levels below 0.05 percent
produced false positives numerous times, in
some cases displaying all six of the intoxication
"clues."36
When a person fails the SFSTs, which
many people often do, the officer will usually
arrest the person for DUI and bring him or her
to the police station either to conduct further
SFSTs or to take a breath sample. This prac-
tice differs from other jurisdictions, many of
which will usually perform a breath test at the
scene to corroborate the SFST results prior to
making an arrest. Despite the fact that the op-
tion for performing the breath test at the scene
is provided in the officers' manual, D.C. officers
often skip this test, knowing that the results are
not admissible in court.37
Unreliable Indicators for Determining Driving Impairment,
GOTOTRIAL.COM (Feb. 2012), http://gototrial.com/standardized-
dui-tests-are-unreliable-indicators-for-detennining-driving-
impairment/ (stating that "'not a single study' links SFSTs to
driving impairment").
33 See NHTSA SFST Manual, supra note 19, § VIII-
1 (including statistics that that Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus
(HGN) test is 77% accurate; the Walk and Turn test is 68%
accurate; and the One Leg Stand test is 65% accurate).
34 See, e.g., Marcelline Bums, The Robustness of the
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, NAT'L HIGHWAY AND TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN. (2007), at 18-22, http://sfst.us/KanePDF/The
Robustness of the Horizontal GazeNystagmusTest.pdf.
35 NHTSA SFST Manual, supra note 19, § VII-3.
36 See Burns, supra note 34, at 18 ("Table 13").
37 See Koenig Pierre, Is a Field Breathalyzer
TestAdministered During a Stop Admissible in Court?,
It. Difficulties with the D.C. DUI Law
The core issue with the D.C. DUI law
occurs when the arrestee provides a breath
sample at the police station that results in a
breath score reading below 0.08 percent. Not-
withstanding the fact that there may have been
no suspicion of drugs recorded or implied in
the police report, prosecutors often go forward
with bringing charges of DUI against these
motorists. The first question raised is how can
prosecutors charge people with DUI who have
produced breath results below 0.08 when 0.08
is supposed to be the "legal limit?" The answer,
albeit vague, is written in the statute. According
to D.C.'s DUI Statute, "Impairment" is defined
by consumption of alcohol "in a way that can
be perceived or noticed."" In other words, de-
spite the fact that a person may be completely
sober or very close to it, e.g., having produced a
breath score of 0.02 percent, a prosecutor may
nevertheless press charges against the motorist
based on the officer's subjective testimony that
he "perceived" or "noticed" drunken behavior.
As such, this standard appears extremely sub-
jective given that the basis for prosecuting a
person for DUI can be based solely on an indi-
vidual officer's personal observations and opin-
ions regarding the person's behavior. While
prosecutors argue that the standard is objec-
tive, this contention is highly contested by de-
fense attorneys, who argue that the standard is
too subjective, arbitrary, unconstitutional, and
one that should not be tolerated by our legal
system.
Furthermore, there is a clause in D.C.'s
DUI Statute that stipulates that a person who
produces a breath score below 0.05 percent
(0.04 and below) is presumed not intoxicated.' 9
PIERRELAWFIRM.COM (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.pierrelawfin.
com/2013/02/04/is-a-breathalyzer-test-taken-immediately-
after-a-stop-admissible-in-court/ (explaining that roadside
breathalyzer results are not admissible in court because the
technology of a roadside breathalyzer is not as accurate as
those kept at the station, which are calibrated and provide a
more exact reading of a person's BAC).
38 D.C. CODE§ 50-2206.01(8) (2013).
39 See D.C. CODE§ 50-2206.51(a)(1) (2013). While
it is neither considered intoxicated per se nor presumed not
Fall 2013 Washington College of Law 75
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Overzealous law enforcement can overcome
this 'rebuttable presumption,' however, by us-
ing their 'experience' and 'training' to "per-
ceive" or "notice" impairment. 4 0 It is extremely
troubling that the "legal limit" of 0.08 has been
undermined by the discretionary decisions
made by police, prosecutors, and even judges
to arrest, charge, and convict persons based on
this distorted interpretation of the law.41
Unfortunately, the subjective standards
written into the statute do not stop at intoxica-
tion; the D.C. DUI Statute further states that
a person is impaired when there is "evidence
that a person is impaired by a drug."42 Again,
this standard is troubling because, as far as the
law is concerned, "evidence" of drugs could es-
sentially mean anything. This vague and un-
clear wording puts a motorist at risk of being
considered under the influence of drugs by a
mere subjective interpretation of the individu-
al's actions or behavior. Rather than this am-
biguous subjective standard, the statute should
intoxicated, the "grey area" of breath scores between 0.05
and 0.07 percent can still survive a Motion of Judgment for
Acquittal if not otherwise resulting in a conviction based on
the subjective testimony of the officers.
40 Specifically, if an officer decides that a person is
intoxicated based on his personal observations and perception
that the person is acting in a way consistent with intoxication,
the officer can arrest the person for DUI notwithstanding
the fact that the person produced a breath score below 0.05
percent.
41 Currently, all fifty states have implemented a legal
limit of 0.08 percent; no state has a legal limit that is either
above or below 0.08. See DMVorg, http://www.dmv.org/
automotive-law/dui.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). D.C.,
however, is not the only jurisdiction to prosecute DUI cases
with blood-alcohol contents below 0.08 percent. See, e.g.,
George Fredrick Mueller, Alcohol Level .07% or Less Yet
StillArrested in California for DUI/DWI, How?, http://www.
avvo.com/legal-guides/ugc/alcohol-level-07-or-less-yet-still-
arrested-for-dui--drunk-driving--dwi--how-in-california (last
visited Jan. 3, 2014) (discussing how California citizens are
routinely being prosecuted for DUI after having produced
breath scores of 0.05 percent or higher). In fact, there has even
been a national push to lower the legal limit to 0.05 percent,
arguing that people can be impaired with BACs at this level.
See Mike M. Ahlers, Tougher Drunk-Driving Threshold
Proposed to Reduce Traffic Deaths, CNN.coM, (May 15, 2013,
6:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/14/us/ntsb-blood-
alcohol/.
42 D.C. CODE§ 50-2206.51(b)(1) (2013).
require chemical testing to prove the presence
of drugs in a person's system.
Also noteworthy is the provision of the
D.C. DUI Statute that has been found uncon-
stitutional by judges presiding over repeat of-
fender cases." Specifically, the Act included a
clause stating that a person with a prior DUI
conviction who refuses to submit to chemical
testing will be presumed to be intoxicated. In
other words, under this section of the Act, the
potential repeat offender's refusal results in
per se guilt of DUI and requires the state to
fulfill no further burden in proving its case.
Accordingly, this clause is essentially "burden
shifting," making it the defense's responsibility
to prove that the person was not intoxicated.*
III. Disharmony Between D.C. DUI Law and
Its Intended Policy
The policy driving the overbroad discre-
tionary strictness of the D.C. DUI Statute is the
zero-tolerance" mindset of law enforcement.
Originally, the D.C. DUI Statute did not con-
tain any language regarding the presumption
of non-intoxication if a breath score below 0.05
percent was produced. In fact, D.C. police au-
thorities proactively enforced their idea of a
"zero-tolerance" DUI policy by arresting any-
one with a blood-alcohol content of 0.01 per-
cent and above.4 ' Additionally, officers would
even arrest motorists with BACs of 0.00 if they
43 See Bryan Brown, Esquire, Law Office of Bryan
Brown, & Thomas Lester, Esquire, Law Office of Thomas
Lester, Handling DUI Cases in DC, Continuing Legal
Education class powerpoint presentation, at slide 15 (Sept. 10,
2013) (on file with author).
44 D.C. CODE § 50-1905(b) (2013) ("If a person
under arrest refuses to submit to specimens for chemical
testing as provided in §50-1904.02(a), and the person has
had a conviction for a prior offense under §50-2206.11,
§50-2206.12, or §50-2206.14, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the person is under the influence of alcohol
or a drug or any combination thereof.").
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See Hanson, supra note 8.
48 Id. ("If you get behind the wheel of a car with any
measurable amount of alcohol, you will be dealt with in
DC. We have zero tolerance ... Anything above .01, we can
arrest.").
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admitted to having a drink earlier in the eve-
ning.49 In one famous instance, a forty-five year
old lawyer was handcuffed, searched, arrested,
put in a jail cell, and charged with DUI after
she admitted to police officers that she had one
glass of chardonnay wine with dinner pro-
ducing a breath score of just 0.03." Shortly af-
ter the case of the "chardonnay lady," as some
people familiar with her story have referred to
her, the D.C. Council amended the D.C. DUI
Statute to include a clause declaring that a per-
son is presumed not intoxicated when he or she
produces a breath score below 0.05 percent.,
Despite the intentions to relax the ex-
tremely stringent "zero-tolerance" policy, the
actual practices of law enforcement have not
seemed to change. Motorists with breath scores
below 0.05 percent and well below the "legal
limit" of 0.08 are being arrested and charged
with DUI. DUI attorneys in the District are re-
taining clients who have been charged under
the DUI statute after producing breath scores
as low as 0.017 percent, 52 and even 0.00.," Clear-
ly, the "zero-tolerance" policy held by officers
in the field remains strong, despite the Act's
attempt to create a more reasonable law. Ad-
ditionally, the government continues to pros-
ecute these cases, hinging its hope on the idea
that judges will convict based on their biases
against drunk drivers.
IW Defenses for the DUI Disaster
DUI defense attorneys dealing with
cases in which their clients have been charged
with DUI after producing breath scores below
49 Id. ("The DC's Attorney General says that it's legal
for drivers to be arrested for DUI (driving under the influence
of alcohol) with 'no registered BAC.' Indeed, DC police do
arrest people with 0.00 BAC if they admit to having had a
single drink with dinner.").
50 Id.
51 See D.C. CODE § 50-2206.51(a)(1) (2013); Telephone
interview with Bryan Brown, supra note 7 (discussing
the details of this highly talked about case and noting its
significance in the evolution of D.C. DUI law) (notes on file
with author).
52 Case received by D.C. criminal defense attorney
David Benowitz.
53 Case on file with author (confidential).
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(and above) 0.08 have several defenses available
to them.
A. Statutory Interpretation
First, defense attorneys can look to the
very language used in the statute to define the
standards that should be applied by the court.
"Impaired," for example, is defined as "a per-
son's ability to operate or be in physical control
of a vehicle is affected, due to consumption of
alcohol or a drug or a combination thereof, in
a way that can be perceived of noticed."5 4 De-
fense attomneys can thus argue that the required
standard of proof has changed; specifically, that
a direct correlation must be shown between the
person's intoxication and his inability to oper-
ate a vehicle in order to prove that the motorist
was 'impaired.' Essentially, the defense should
ask for a new jury instruction that clarifies this
standard of proof to the triers of fact when it is
a jury trial case.
B. Knowing the Law Better than the
Adversary
Next, defense attorneys will often find
portions of the Act buried in the statute that
law enforcement ignores, and then can use this
knowledge against the government at trial. D.C.
Code § 50-2206.52(b), for instance, states that
"[a]ny person upon whom a breath specimen
is collected shall be informed, in writing, of the
provisions of §50-2206.52 and §50-2206.52(a) at
the time that the person is charged." However,
this requirement is not always met. Another
issue defense attorneys can stress is the new
foundational requirements prescribed in §50-
2206.52, allowing defense attorneys to expand
the materials included in theirRosser requests.""
54 D.C. CODE § 50-2206.01(8) (2013).
55 Pursuant to Rosser v. United States, 281 A.2d 598
(D.C. 1977), defense attorneys memorialize their discovery
requests in a letter, asking for more information from the
government, including any evidence deemed exculpatory
under Maryland v. Brady, 373 U.S. 73 (1963).
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Moreover, §50-1904,," §5-1501.06(h)(3)," and
§5-1501.07" allow defense attorneys access to
extensive records. It is vital that defense at-
torneys proactively ask for these specific items
and hold the government to its obligations un-
der the Act.
With these items at their fingertips, de-
fense attorneys can begin to build defenses
based on faulty machinery, incorrectly admin-
istered tests sometimes conducted by uncer-
tified officers, or incorrectly calibrated breatha-
lyzer machines." If defense attorneys become
knowledgeable enough on what the stringent
requirements are and can point out faults, they
will likely be successful in suppressing breath
scores. One example is that the United States
Park Police require a twenty-minute observa-
tion period prior to administering a breath test;
without fulfilling this requirement, the breath
scores are not valid.o The government would
56 D.C. CODE §50-1904 (2013) ("Full information
concerning the chemical test results administered in this
chapter, including records as provided in §5-1501.06(h)(3),
shall be made available to the person from whom specimens
were obtained pursuant to Rule 16 of the District of Columbia
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.").
57 D.C. CODE §5-1501.06(h)(3) (2011) entitles the
defense to collect records of: lab notes and bench notes;
worksheets, graphs, and charts; photographs; raw data;
reports; statistical information used to calculate probabilities
and uncertainty; any logs related to the equipment materials
used in testing; any written communications or records of
oral communications regarding a specific individual case
between the department and any other agency or between the
department and any person not employed by the department;
proficiency test results for individual examiners involved in
the analysis.
58 D.C. CODE §5-1501.07(b)(1)-(3) (2013) ("In addition
to the requirements under subsection (a) of this section, the
Department shall: (1) Develop a program for District law
enforcement personnel to become trained and certified as
a breath test instrument operator; (2) Develop policies and
procedures for the operation and maintenance of al breath test
instruments utilized by District law enforcement personnel;
and (3) Develop policies and procedures for maintenance of
records demonstrating that the breath test instruments utilized
by District law enforcement personnel are in proper operating
condition.").
59 Defense attorneys should look for machine
error, breathing pattern error, core body temperature error,
hematocrit error, partition ratio error, mouth alcohol error, and
extrapolation error.
60 See United States Park Police Traffic Safety Unit
then have to prove its case solely on SFST re-
sults and other observations mentioned by the
testifying officers. In addition, if the prosecu-
tion fails to provide any of these requested doc-
uments, or fails to respond to a video preserva-
tion request, a defense attorney may move to
dismiss the entire case.
C. Learn the NHTSA SFST Manual
Under the D.C. DUI Statute, defense at-
torneys are entitled to all of the manuals used by
law enforcement. Accordingly, one of the most
effective defenses becomes the defense attor-
ney's ability to learn the manual better than the
officers, providing for an extremely thorough
cross-examination that adversely affects officer
credibility. In the manual, for instance, officers
are taught word-for-word (literally in quota-
tions) what they are to say while administering
the SFSTs. What defense attorneys will often
be able to successfully point out, however, is
that the officers have not memorized these di-
rections. The most effective way to display this
lack of memorization in open court is to ask the
officer to recite the directions as the manual
prescribes. In doing so, defense attorneys will
be able to point out the errors made during the
officer's administration of the SFSTs, thereby
discounting the alleged results produced by
the SFSTs when the tests were conducted."
Even more compelling, once the officers have
performed the SFST directions incorrectly in
court, defense attorneys can then argue that
the particular officer would not have passed his
course, and is therefore unqualified to testify as
an expert witness.
Further, even if the SFSTs were admin-
istered correctly, defense attorneys will want to
Intoximeter EC/IR II Operator Manual, at 11 ("To eliminate
the possibility of mouth alcohol contaminating a breath
sample, United States Park Police's breath test procedures
require the safeguard of a 20 minute observation period.").
61 For example, prior to administering the SFSTs,
officers should be asking whether the motorist has had any
injuries, accidents, or inner ear issues. Additionally, defense
attorneys will want to point out the positive information
detailed in the officer's reports, the errors documented in the
paperwork, and the omitted details the officer is trained to
document.
78 Washington College of Law Fall 2013
8
Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 1 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/6
point out the lack of credibility of the tests, as
well as alternative explanations for the results.
For instance, the motorist may have been suf-
fering from a pathological disorder, from dry-
eyes, or from an injury hindering his ability to
balance correctly. Moreover, external factors
such as wind, traffic, light, and dust may play a
role in the reliability of the SFST results.
Finally, in building a successful DUI de-
fense especially for those cases in which the
government relies heavily upon the officer's ob-
servational testimony pointing out the over-
broad "Indicators" in the officers' manual for
DUI detection is very effective. For instance,
according to the officers' manual, the most
common and reliable initial indicators of DUI
include almost all traffic offenses.62 As such, de-
fense attorneys will want to point out that these
traffic violations are extremely common and
are committed by sober drivers on a daily basis.
Then, defense attorneys will want to discount
the government's contention that the defendant
was unable to "divide his attention" by point-
ing out factors such as the motorist's ability to
operate a manual vehicle, requiring divided at-
tention to shift gears while operating a clutch.
V Diminishing the D.C. DUI Debacle
Ultimately, the only way to solve the cur-
rent overzealous prosecution problem is to cre-
ate enough awareness to initiate change. D.C.
Council members should work toward revising
the D.C. DUI Statute and amending the Act to
be less overbroad and vague. Clearer defini-
tions and narrower standards for determining
the point of impairment are necessary to shield
innocent drivers from being prosecuted for
DUI. Moreover, local law enforcement authori-
ties should create better training programs for
identifying intoxicated persons and relax their
"zero-tolerance" policy, as was intended by the
62 Specifically, turning with a wide radius, weaving,
turning abruptly or illegally, stopping inappropriately,
accelerating/decelerating rapidly, swerving, following
too closely, driving too fast, driving too slow, or braking
erratically. See 2006 NHTSA SFST Manual, supra note 19,
§§ V-4 - V-6 (listing the "visual cue descriptions" to look for
when pulling a motorist over for a DUI potential stop).
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Act. Motorists with blood-alcohol contents be-
low 0.05 percent should not be prosecuted for
DUI unless a suspicion of drugs exists, that is
then proven with chemical testing. Addition-
ally, a higher standard should be implemented
when prosecuting motorists for DUI who have
produced breath scores between 0.05 and 0.07
percent.
The bottom line is that changes must
take place, and that further reform of the cur-
rent D.C. DUI Statute must be initiated. If the
current practices of DUI law continue, many
will begin to fear driving, even while sober, if
such fear has not already set in. In the mean-
time, the strongest defense against the problem
is zealous representation provided by DUI de-
fense attorneys who can use preparation and
perseverance to defeat erroneous DUI charges
against innocent motorists in the District.
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